.
by Geoffrey Kemp, John Allen Gay
President Obama stated recently that Iran could develop a nuclear
bomb in over a year. As negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program
continue to drag on with little sign of a breakthrough, the odds
increase that an armed conflict will eventually break out. The chances
are significant that the United States would either start or be sucked
into this war. What would the consequences be? What are the
alternatives? Our new book War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences can serve as a guide to these questions.
The United States would make destroying Iran’s major nuclear
facilities its primary aim, and it would likely be successful within
hours of a conflict breaking out. Iran’s known nuclear sites are heavily
defended or buried in the earth, but the U.S. arsenal contains aircraft
that can penetrate the defenses and munitions that can penetrate the
bunkers. Iran probably has other, smaller nuclear sites that are not
known. If these are not identified and destroyed, they can serve as the
building-blocks of a reconstructed nuclear program—or even enable an
attempt at a rapid breakout. Still, there is little doubt that the
United States could deal Iran’s nuclear program a massive setback.
This will not be the only front of a war, however. Iran’s leaders
have threatened the West with retaliation too frequently and too
publicly to simply ignore an attack. Iran has agents and allies that may
commit acts of terrorism. Lebanese Hezbollah’s deadly bombing of a bus
full of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria and the discovery of a
similar plot in Cyprus are examples of this capability. And
assassination plots against Israeli diplomats in India, Georgia,
Thailand and Kenya, as well as the Saudi ambassador in Washington, show
Iranian willingness to commit acts of terrorism as part of its strategy.
Iran also has many small military speedboats, midget submarines and
antiship missiles. It may use these to attack American vessels near its
shores or to disrupt the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. An
oil blockade, if successful and sustained, would send shockwaves through
the global economy, as roughly a fifth of the world’s internationally
traded oil passes through the strait.
But Iran’s leaders know that such a severe step would risk a severe
response, and it is unlikely that they’d be able to effectively seal
Hormuz. Thus, they are more likely to launch a sustained campaign of
pinprick harassment—a missile here, a few floating mines there, spread
out over hours, days and weeks. When combined with actions by Iranian
operatives in neighboring countries and possibly by Iran’s ballistic
missile forces, this will create uncertainty for any attacker—too
violent to be peace, but not fully war. This state of affairs will put
Iran on a more level footing with the United States, and will challenge
U.S. policy makers to come up with an appropriate response. A sustained
entanglement may result.
The economic impact of this kind of war would be negative. Regardless
of how the conflict proceeds, there would be a significant spike in oil
prices; if the war is not swift and decisive, the spike could last for
weeks or months. The impact of this should not be underestimated,
especially given the fragility of the global economic recovery. A $10
increase in the price per barrel of oil would take a billion dollars
from American consumers in about five days. War could see oil between
$150 and $200 per barrel. High prices would harm most states, although
oil exporters outside the Persian Gulf region, like Russia and
Venezuela, could see a windfall.
The economic fallout would drive much of the war’s negative political
impact. Asian nations, which are the recipients of much Gulf oil, would
be particularly unhappy. Washington’s European allies also would be
divided at best. Relations with Russia and China would suffer most. Both
states are alarmed by U.S. willingness to use force to reshape the
strategic environment, and a major conflict with Iran could see the two
taking steps to be an effective counterbalance. This could include
helping Iran rebuild and rearm.
The unprecedented international sanctions regime against Iran would
likely fall apart in the wake of a war. Some would loosen sanctions out
of frustration with the United States. Some might yield to public
pressure over images of Iranian suffering. The war’s oil-price shocks
may tempt others to improve relations with oil-producing Iran. The net
effect would be a reduction in Iran’s isolation.
A war thus has significant costs and dangers. Yet there is no
guarantee that it would solve the Iranian nuclear threat. Iran can
always rebuild its nuclear facilities. Being attacked by a superpower
might convince Tehran that nuclear weapons aren’t worth the price. Yet
it might also reinforce the case for getting a nuclear deterrent to make
future attacks less likely. The strategic problem for the United States
after the war would thus be the same as it was before: getting Iran to
abandon the threatening elements of its nuclear program.
The United States might not start the war. Israeli prime minister
Benjamin Netanyahu has been singularly determined to bring the Iran
crisis to a swift resolution. The rest of the Israeli security
establishment shares many of Netanyahu’s worries. If Israel strikes Iran
on its own, and the United States is drawn in, the U.S.-Israeli
relationship will likely suffer. Polls already show fading sympathy for
Israel on the American left; an unpopular war could fuel this trend.
As counterintuitive as it may seem, Iran could also start the war.
Certain hardline cliques within Iran are willing to engage in
provocative actions. If a terror plot like that against the Saudi
ambassador to the United States were to succeed, it would likely be seen
as a casus belli. Further, Iran’s economic isolation is a source of
tension that it could seek to alleviate by provoking instability.
Needless to say, inaction has its own costs. There is not yet any
indication that Iran has chosen to build a bomb, but as its nuclear
program steadily advances, detecting and stopping a rush to weaponize
will become more difficult.
An Iran with a nuclear weapon will be better-equipped to resist the
efforts of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. There
will be fewer options if relations sour. Still, Iran isn’t likely to
give atomic weapons to terrorists or launch sudden nuclear
attacks—history suggests that even the most radical regimes that get the
bomb, like Mao’s China, become very wary of using it. Iran’s leaders
may sponsor terror, but they are not out to commit national suicide by
provoking nuclear retaliation against their country.
Perhaps the biggest concern with an Iranian bomb is that it will end
the nuclear nonproliferation regime and provoke a cascade of
proliferation, not only in the Middle East but in South and East Asia,
including South Korea and Japan. This would be a significant setback for
the United States, which has long made nonproliferation a center of its
foreign policy. The risk of a nuclear conflict would increase.
Still, the case for war with Iran is not very strong. Tehran’s
nuclear ambitions will only end when its strategic anxieties are
assuaged. A bombing campaign merely pushes the question back a few
years. A more aggressive U.S. negotiating strategy is a better solution.
Washington should link sanctions relief more closely to progress in
talks, and coordinate this with the other sanctioning powers. It should
consider offering an upgrade in relations with Tehran in return for the
resolution of all nuclear issues. This would have to include an
intrusive and sustained nuclear-inspection regime as the cornerstone of a
deal. It should take a pragmatic view of negotiations: allowing very
limited and closely monitored enrichment within Iran is far preferable
to war, and is less risky. With steps like these, the United States can
serve its own self-interest and avoid becoming tangled in another Middle
Eastern war it cannot afford.
Geoffrey Kemp and John Allen Gay are coauthors of War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences. Kemp is director of the regional security program at the Center for the National Interest and served on the National Security Council during the Reagan administration. Gay is an assistant editor at The National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-high-cost-war-iran-8265#.UVDN_K6Y7U8.twitter